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COMMENTARY
DEMOCRACY IN THE CLASSROOM:
DUE PROCESS AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
INTRODUCTION
A teacher walks into a classroom and hears glass breaking.
Inside he sees two students running out the other exit. He recog-
nizes them and gives their names and a report of the incident to
the principal. The principal calls the boys into the office and tells
them that they have been suspended for five days. A denial of due
process?
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is comprised of
both substantive and procedural elements. Substantive due process
is concerned with the substantive rights of a person to speech,
assembly, hair and dress style. This article will not include a discus-
sion of the substantive due process rights of the student. It will
instead concentrate on procedural due process, the right of a per-
son to have a fair procedure followed to determine whether an
interference with his rights is justified. More specifically, the dis-
cussion will focus on the basic elements of procedural due process,
notice and hearing, and attempt to describe their application to the
school disciplinary process.
Courts have traditionally demonstrated reluctance in exercising
their judicial power in the area of school administration, deferring
to the school authorities wide discretionary authority in operating
their schools. Typical of the sentiments on the subject is the com-
ment by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Epperson
v. Arkansas' where the Court stated:
By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and can not
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and
sharply implicate basic constitutional values.2
The underlying reasons for this position of judicial self-
restraint are numerous and often reflect the personal predilictions
of the individual courts. There is, however, a common thread that
1. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
2. Id. at 104.
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can be found in most of the opinions, and, expressed in its most
basic terms, it is the special relationship between the student and
the "teacher" that exists in the educational setting. The most often
cited aspect of this special relationship in the early cases is the
doctrine of in loco parentis.3
In loco parentis perceives the role of the school in dealing with
a child as an extension of the concept of the state as parens patrie.
The school, under this concept, performs the functions of surrogate
parent while the child is at school since the parent is unable to care
for the child. Among the duties that a school must exercise in this
role is that of discipline. While the procedures adopted by each
school vary, administrators believe that the procedure must be
informal so that it will most closely resemble the methodology of
the parent.
While the doctrine is conceptually sound, its application fails
to recognize the realities of the school-student relationship in that
it does not admit to the inherent differences between the role of
school authorities and the parent as protector of the interests of
the child. The basic difference in perspective from which each sees
and deals with the child was explained over a century ago by the
Vermont Supreme Court where it said:
From the intimacy and nature of the relation, and the necessary
character of family government, the law suffers no intrusion
upon the authority of the parent, and the privacy of domestic life,
unless in extreme cases of cruelty and injustice. This parental
power is little liable to abuse, for it is continually restrained by
natural affection, the tenderness which the parent feels for his
offspring, an affection on the alert, and acting rather by instinct
than reasoning.
The school master has no such natural restraint. Hence he
may not safely be trusted with all a parent's authority, for he
does not act from the instinct of parental affection. He should
be guided and restrained by judgment and with discretion, and
hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise.'
In recent years not only has the "surrogate parent" concept
3. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (dissenting opinion); Wisconsin Indus.
School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 668, 79 N.W. 422 (1899); Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 181 S.W. 204 (1913). See generally Buss, Procedural Due Process
for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PENN. L. REV. 545, 559
(1971). Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CAsE W. REs. L. REV.
378 (1969). State ex rel. Burple v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150 (1878).
4. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122-23 (1859).
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behind school discipline been attacked, but so has the belief that
informality in discipline was beneficial and necessary to a child's
growth and development. In the case of In Re Gault5 the court
expressed the opinion that the paternal role of the juvenile courts
was of dubious merit and practically ineffective as a substitute for
due process safeguards. While the case involved juvenile courts
rather than school discipline, the conclusion reached that the bene-
fits of an informal procedure are either non-existent or such that
they could be preserved under a proper application of due process
is equally applicable to the area of school discipline.' The court was
not challenging the sincerity and interest of those who deal with
children, but was simply saying that good motives are not enough
when a serious threat to a person's liberty is at hand.
A second explanation for the history of judicial self-restraint in
the area of school discipline can be found in the nature of the
educational system itself. As the training ground for tomorrow's
citizens, schools have been given the task of providing to each pupil
through classroom experiences and the disciplinary process an un-
derstanding of the need in our society to have rules and to abide
by those rules. The importance of school discipline in this develop-
ment was stated by Supreme Court Justice Black when he said:
School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and im-
portant part of training our children to be good citizens-to be
better citizens.7
Since school discipline is a part of the educational process, the
courts concluded that its implementation and application should be
left to the educators who are best trained to that end.
The unique relationship between the student and the teacher
5. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. The possible harm that can arise out of an informal proceeding was outlined in a
report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement:
There is increasing evidence that informal procedures, contrary to original expecta-
tions, may themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treatment of the
delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a sense of injustice provoked
by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority by judge and proba-
tion officers.
There is a growing tendency today to reject the theory entirely and a number of courts
have done so. Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968), Goldberg v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). See also, Abbott, Due Process
and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 378 (1969); Buss, Procedural
Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PENN. L.
REv. 545 (1971).
7. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
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has provided the courts with reason for being hesitant about be-
coming involved in school discipline. It is a relationship built on
trust, friendship and understanding and requires the teacher to
perform many roles, including educator, friend and surrogate par-
ent, depending on the needs of the student.8 An adversary relation-
ship has no place in this context and the teacher seeks to avoid its
appearance if at all possible.
The detached formal disciplinary proceeding is seen as a threat
to the maintenance of the ideal teacher-student relationship with
the corresponding detrimental effect on the student's ability to
learn. Instead of being partners in the joint venture of learning,
they will become combatants seeking to defeat each other. Regard-
less of the result, the teacher could never again regain the trust of
the student and would remain forever a part of the "system" who
could not be trusted.
These arguments were often used by courts as justification for
their posture of judicial self-restraint in the area of student disci-
pline even when confronted with the allegations of students who
claimed that the informal procedures then in use denied them their
due process rights guaranteed in the Constitution. It was not until
1961 in the case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education'
that a court declared that a student who was not given a hearing
before expulsion was denied due process of law. While this case
was of great importance because it acknowledged that the judicial
process must become involved in school discipline when constitu-
tional rights are threatened, not until 1975 in the case of Goss v.
Lopez" was such a position adopted by the United States Supreme
Court. In opening a new dimension to the role of the judicial
branch of government in our society the courts were saying that
despite the possible negative effects judicial interference might
have on the operations of a school, students are citizens who do
not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door and are
therefore entitled to the protections of due process.
The moving force behind the change in attitude by the courts
can be tracedto a closer look and recognition of the student's right
to and interest in an education. In the past half century it has
8. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (dissenting opinion); Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 160 (5th Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion); Madera
v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
9. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 920 (1961).
10. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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become a necessity of our society and its importance to an individ-
ual defies measurement. As eloquently stated in Brown v. Board
of Education:"
Today education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. . . .It is the principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education."2
As important as the interest in education is in our society, a
person's right to an education is not in itself a constitutionally
protected interest so as to be clothed with due process protection.13
This is not necessarily fatal, however, as protected interests in
property are not normally created by the Constitution but rather
are defined to be such by independent sources such as state or
federal statutes."
State laws 5 which extend the right to a free public education
to all citizens have been found to create a "protected interest" that
can not be denied without satisfying the requirements of due pro-
cess. Such a position was pronounced in the case of Goss v. Lopez"8
where the Court stated:
Having chosen to extend the right to an education to the people
of appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right
on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures
to determine whether the misconduct has occurred. (citation
omitted).
Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to es-
tablish and maintain a public school system, it has nevertheless
done so and has required its children to attend. Those young
people do not "shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse
door." Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Id. at 493.
13. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
14. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 572, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972).
15. See Wis. STAT. § 120.13 (1973); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.01 et seq.
16. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
1975]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce stan-
dards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad,
must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards.
Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a stu-
dent's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property
interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which
may not be taken away from misconduct without adherence to
the minimum procedures required by that Clause. 7
The courts since Dixon.generally recognized the effect that an
expulsion or long term suspension would have on a student's right
to an education and required schools to adopt discplinary proce-
dures that conformed with the requirements of due process." They
were generally unwilling however, until Goss to accord the same
protections to a student when the penalty involved was of short
duration. The theory behind according different treatment to an
expulsion and a short suspension was the belief that the short
suspension constituted neither a severe detriment or grievous loss
to the student, and being therefore de minimis, due process protec-
tions were not required.
The United States Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez 9 cast aside
the distinction between expulsion and short suspensions and held
that any penalty arising out of a disciplinary proceeding that de-
nied a student the right to attend school could not be imposed
without conforming to the requirements of due process. In reach-
ing this conclusion the Court made the following comment:
.. . [W]hether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the "weight" but to the nature of the interest
at stake. (citation omitted). . . [T]he length and consequent
17. Id. at 574.
18. Soglin v. Kaufman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), af'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th
Cir. 1969); Strickler v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis.
1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970); Keller v. Fuchs, 385 F. Supp. 262
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cerl. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1967); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1964); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2nd Cir. 1970), Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1967); Estaban v. Central Missouri State College, 415
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Vought v. Van Buren Public
Schools, 305 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Fielder v. Board of Education of School
District of Winnebago, Neb., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344
F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Educa-
tion, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968), en banc.
19. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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severity of a deprivation, while another factor to weigh in deter-
mining the appropriate form of hearing, "is not decisive of the
basic right" to a hearing of some kind. (citation omitted). The
Court's view has been that as long as a property deprivation is
not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether
account must be taken of the Due Process Clause. (citation omit-
ted). A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our
view and may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due
Process Clause." (emphasis added).
It is generally conceded that due process in school discipline
does not require a full trial laden with all the components of a court
of law, as the disciplinary process is not to be considered a criminal
proceeding."1 On the other hand, the procedure required must be
something more than an informal interview and the rudiments of
an adversary proceeding should be preserved.12 Additionally there
is the requirement that findings of the disciplinary proceeding must
be based on evidence of a nature from which a substantial basis of
fact can be reached.2
I. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE
The actual form that the disciplinary proceeding must take so
as to conform with the requirements of due process is no different
than any other area of the law and was outlined in Dixon v. Ala-
bama State Board of Education.24 According to Dixon, a student
subject to discipline is entitled to:
1. Notice of the charges which includes a statement of the
specific charges and grounds to substantiate those allega-
tions,
20. Id. at 575-76.
21. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Madera v. Bd. of Education, 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2nd Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Zanders v. Bd. of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747,
759 (W.D. La. 1968).
22. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
23. General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133,
(W.D. Mo. 1968), en bane; Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377 (Kan. 1973); Black Students v.
Williams, 335 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Scaggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F. Supp. 161
(W.D. Mo. 1968); Jones v. State Board of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 31
(1970). See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969).
24. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
1975]
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2. A hearing, prior to the imposition of discipline, the
nature of which depends on the circumstances.
3. The right of the accused to be given the underlying
evidence which forms the foundation for the accusation
leveled against the student, and
4. The right of the accused to be accorded the opportunity
at the hearing to present his own defense and to produce
either oral testimony or written affidavits on his behalf.21
In determining the scope and nature of these elements that is
required to satisfy the requirements of due process one must bal-
ance the competing interest involved.26 The weighing of the com-
peting interests must be performed for each situation separately,
reflecting the flexible and fluid nature of due process itself. As
stated by Justice Stewart, due process is an individual and practical
matter that by its very nature "... negates any concept of inflexi-
ble procedures universally applied to every imaginable situation. 27
The balancing process must therefore be performed whenever
a charge of denial of due process is at issue and requires to be
placed on one side the importance of allowing school personnel
to operate the school, given the complex and special demands of
education. This need of the school officials to handle all aspects
of education, including discipline, with minimal outside assistance,
is especially strong in emergency situations that threaten the tran-
quility of the school atmosphere.
Against this must be placed the student's protected interest in
education. While the Court in Goss said that this interest was not
de minimis,21 one should not infer from that statement that the
court was suggesting that a student's interest at stake in a case of
expulsion is the same as when he is subject only to the penalty of
a short suspension.
The permanency of expulsion is likely to have far more impact
on a student's emotional state and his ability to acquire an educa-
tion than the short suspension. The due process that is required in
each of these situations should therefore reflect this difference by
requiring more formalized procedures in expulsion cases than is
25. Id. at 158-59.
26. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975); Hannah v. Larcha, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969).
27. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
28. 419 U.S. at 576.
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required for short suspensions.
Such a basic difference at the outset between the requirements
of due process for expulsions and short suspensions was recognized
in Goss v. Lopez. 9 While not spelling out how significant the
differences between the two should be the Court said:
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves
solely to the short term suspensions, not exceeding 10 days.
Longer suspension or expulsions for the remainder of the school
term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.31
The balance of this article will consist of an analysis of the
elements of due process that are subject to the balancing test out-
lined above. For the sake of clarity and a better understanding of
the scope of each element, a separate analysis will be made of each
element. It should be remembered, however, that denial of due
process is not predicated on the failure to satisfy any one element
but rather can only be determined from looking at the procedure
as a whole.
In the analysis of these elements, a distinction will also be made
between short suspensions and long term suspensions-expulsions
where the courts have found a particular element requires different
treatment. Exactly what constitutes a short term or long term
suspension has been determined by the number of days that a
student is prohibited from attending school. Goss draws the line
at ten days. Whether this particular number of days is conclusive
in this respect remains to be settled.
As a final introductory comment, this article's analysis of due
process will concentrate on its procedural requirement, that is to
say, what form the disciplinary proceedings must take. A very
important aspect of school discipline, the rules and regulations that
provide the grounds for discipline of a student and their compli-
ance with the requirements of due process is beyond the scope of
this article.
A. Notice
In outlining the notice component of due process, Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education31 held that notice requires a
statement of the specific charge and grounds which, if proven,
29. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
30. Id. at 584.
31. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1961).
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would justify expulsion. 3 The purpose of the notice requirement
is to provide sufficient information to the accused of the nature of
the charges being made against him so that he can prepare and
present an adequate defense.
1. Long Term Suspension-Expulsion
The courts since Dixon have expanded on this general state-
ment of principle by saying that in severe disciplinary cases, the
student should be given notice in writing of the specific grounds for
discipline and the nature of the evidence on which the proceeding
will be based. Exactly what will constitute a "sufficient statement"
for due process purposes depends on the circumstances of each
case, but the courts have required as a minimum that the substance
of the charge to be described in sufficient detail,3 and that the
notice contain the names of the principle witnesses and some ex-
planation of the facts to which they will attest. 4
A second aspect of the notice requirement of due process is the
interval of time between the notice of the hearing and the hearing
itself. Giving a student notice of the charges which he faces is not
very beneficial in preparing his defense and can not be considered
adequate for due process purposes if he is not given sufficient time
to analyze the charges so as to be able to intelligently prepare that
defense.
32. Id. at 158-59.
33. Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416,418 (W.D. Wis.
1969); Lowery v. Adams, 344 F. Supp. 446, 451-52 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Linwood v. Board of
Education, City of Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150 II1., 463 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1972), where
the charge "for allegedly attacking and striking other students in the halls of the school on
September 10, 1970" was found to be sufficient.
In Keller v. Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262, 266 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the court found the following
charge insufficient:
"Your son continues to conduct himself in an irresponsible and disruptive manner"
and "he has been deliberately defiant of reasonable requests by teachers," "on three
occasions within the past few weeks."
The court said that these statements require more approximate dates and recitation of the
specific conduct that is in question.
34. Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972); De Jesus v.
Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Tibbs v. Board of Education, 59 N.J. 506,
284 A.2d 179 (1971); Vail v. Board of Education of Portsmouth School District, 354 F.
Supp. 592 (D.N.H. 1973); Black Students v. Williams, 335 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Vaught v. Van Buren, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F.
Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance
in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968), en banc; Center for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337
F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
Contra, Linwood v. Board of Education, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972); Keller v. Fochs,
385 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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In making a determination as to how much time should elapse
between the notice and the hearing, one must look at the particular
circumstances of each case. Factors to be considered in determin-
ing what is a sufficient time period include the nature and complex-
ity of the charge, the type of evidence needed to answer the charge
and its availability, and the time needed to gather witnesses.
While the timing aspect of the notice requirement has not been
a determinative issue in most school discipline litigation, courts
have commented on the need for the time to be reasonable.3 5 As
a result, the cases do not fall into any particular pattern. In making
a determination as to whether the time is sufficient in length for
any particular case, the focus must be on whether the student was
disadvantaged in fact in preparing his defense.36
2. Short Term
The notice requirement for short term suspensions is far less
structured than that required for expulsion. The United States
Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez said that a student facing a
short suspension must be given "some kind of notice and some
kind of hearing. ' 38 Justice White later expanded on this require-
ment saying that there should be oral or written notice of the
charges against the student and that the notice should inform the
student of what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the
accusation is.31
35. Mills v. Board of Education of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Center
for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126, 136 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Fielder v.
Board of Education, 346 F. Supp. 722, 724 (D. Neb. 1972); Vaught v. Van Buren Public
Schools, 305 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp.
835 (5th Cir. 1974); Vail v. Board of Education of Portsmouth School District, 354 F. Supp.
592, 603 (D.N.H. 1973); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 307 F. Supp.
1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
The time between the notice and hearing can be too long. In Graham v. Knutyen, 351
F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972) the court said that two to three months between notice and
the hearing is unreasonable and excessive and constitutes constructive expulsion. The court
recognized that delays may be partially justified because of the special subjective character
of the individual problems that face school officials, including environmental, social and
intellectual differences. Circumstances may require testing, conferences and consultation
with outside third parties prior to the hearing. Delays may be caused by uncooperative
parents or students. Regardless of these factors which tend to require time, the school still
has a duty to arrive at a conclusion and decision without delay.
36. Due v. Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
Fla. 1963).
37. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
38. Id. at 579.
39. Id. at 581.
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The timing requirement of notice is also less imposing in the
short term suspension. The court in Goss stated:
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and
the time of hearing. In the great majority of cases the discipli-
narian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the
student minutes after it has occurred.40
While the court found that there need be no delay between the
time the student is given notice and the time of the hearing, care
must be taken to note that the court qualified that statement by
saying "in the great majority of cases," suggesting that this sum-
mary action is not applicable to all situations. A student can still
be placed in a position of substantial disadvantage as a result of
"insufficient timing" so as to be denied a fair hearing. While the
length of time will seldom be equivalent of that required in expul-
sion cases, the test of whether in fact the student was disadvantaged
as a result of a lack of time is still a viable test to be used.
B. The Hearing
1. Overview
Exactly what constitutes a "hearing" for due process purposes
presents the same problems as defining due process because of the
flexibility courts have accorded to the term. In its most elementary
form it requires a hearing body to hear the evidence constituting
the charge, hear the accused, and make available to the accused a
statement which reflects the decision they have made.
In trying to define what type of hearing is required before
disciplinary action can be taken against a student the courts have
noted at the onset that it would be a very strange discipline system
if there was no communication between the school and the student
with all discipline decisions the product of a secret one-sided deter-
mination of the facts. Not only would such a system be contrary
to the fundamental framework of education, but secrecy in itself
is not congenial to truth seeking and would contradict all that the
school tries to teach a student." Therefore, courts have stressed
that some effort must be made to inform the student of his alleged
wrong and provide him with the opportunity to tell his side of the
story-24
40. Id. at 582.
41. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 580.
42. Id. at 581; Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
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2. Long Term Suspension-Expulsion
The framework of this hearing was enumerated in Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Education." The court made no attempt
to establish a universal standard for the hearing but said that the
form that such hearing would take depends on the circumstances
of each case. The overriding consideration in the establishment of
any procedure however, was to enable both sides to have the oppor-
tunity to be heard by the hearing body.
The court then outlined the basic rudiments of the hearing.
They said that while a school disciplinary hearing was not of such
a nature to require a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
cross-examine witnesses not being required, the basic concept of
an adversary proceeding should be preserved. This meant, said the
court, that at a minimum the student must be given the names of
the witnesses to be used against him and an oral or written report
of the facts to which each would testify. In addition, he should be
given the opportunity to present a defense to the charges and to
be permitted to produce either oral testimony or written affidavits
of witnesses on his behalf.44 While the hearing need not be a full
fledged trial, the seriousness of school disciplinary matters requires
that the student be given the fullest opportunity to present his case.
3. The Short Term Suspension
The Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez" held that in most short
term suspensions only an "informal" hearing was required to sat-
isfy the demands of due process. This informal hearing requires
giving oral or written notice of the charges to the student and if
he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have.
The student is then provided the opportunity to present his side of
the story."
This informal give-and-take proceeding that is authorized by
Goss would be in most cases similar to the type of hearing that a
father would give a child who he suspects has done something
wrong. It is not however, to take on the character of explaining to
the student why he is being punished but should retain an investiga-
tive and search-for-the-truth tenor.47
43. See Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
44. Id. at 159.
45. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
46. Id. at 581.
47. Id. at 582; see p. 720 infra.
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This need for the hearing to serve the purpose of fact-finding
rather than explaining the punishment should exist even where the
disciplinarian himself witnessed the conduct which forms the basis
for the charge. Justice White in speaking of this situation and the
need to prevent hasty judgments commented:
But things are not always as they seem to be, and the student will
at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put
it in what he deems the proper context. 8
Given this "informal hearing," the question arises about the
duty of the disciplinarian at the culmination of the informal hear-
ing with the student. Is he free to suspend the student immediately
without inquiring into the information and explanation given to
him by the student at the hearing?
The Court in Goss at least suggested that in some circumstan-
ces the initial informal hearing may not be enough. The initial
hearing may alert the disciplinarian to the existence of a genuine
dispute about the facts and arguments concerning cause and effect.
The student may offer an alibi. If these questions exist, the Court
said that the disciplinarian may make a determination that there
is a need to summon the accusor, permit cross-examination, and
allow the student to present his own witnesses; in other words,
conduct a more formal hearing.49
This apparent requirement for the disciplinarian to take addi-
tional investigative measures if there exists a genuine dispute over
facts or cause and effect would probably not require a more formal
hearing in all circumstances. Many times a simple check of the
student's story by talking to witnesses or going to the scene of the
occurrence would be sufficient. At relatively slight expense to the
disciplinarian, it provides the student with a further safeguard to
insure that the disciplinarian has all the facts before him in their
proper light before any decision on the guilt of the student is made.
This additional requirement for the hearing body to take the
added step of looking into the student's story has found acceptance
in another school suspension case, Buck v. Carter." There the
court said that if the student offers a statement that says that he
was not present when the alleged act occurred, and says that there
are witnesses who will say that he was elsewhere at the time, that
48. Id. at 584.
49. Id. at 583-84.
50. 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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it is probably constitutionally necessary to make an investigation
of that alibi.5' Likewise if the student admits his presence when the
act occurred but offers an explanation that might reasonably con-
stitute an excuse, it may be necessary to provide a second hearing
where the student could confront his accusers.52
This duty for the disciplinarian to investigate facts that have
been put in issue by the student's statements in the informal hear-
ing seems to be fundamentally sound. While the interest of the
student that is threatened by punishment is not as substantial in
short term suspensions as in expulsions, Goss still found that the
actions that led to that interest being taken away must comply with
the requirements of due process. The need for this additional safe-
guard becomes even more apparent when one realizes that since the
student is not entitled to present witnesses on his own behalf at the
hearing as a matter of right,53 his defense is limited to what he tells
the disciplinarian. A person could hardly be considered to have
been afforded the right to present a meaningful defense if there was
no vehicle available to the student through which his statements
could be verified and reinforced.
The additional burden that would be placed on the hearing
officer to conduct an inquiry into the student's statements before
determining guilt would be minimal. In many cases the additional
investigation will consist of nothing more than talking to the accus-
ing teacher or student again in light of the questions raised by the
student. In others it will involve talking to other witnesses whose
existence was revealed to the disciplinary officer for the first time
at the initial hearing or going to the scene of the incident to try to
recreate what happened in light of statements by both sides. If
these further inquiries are not conclusive in establishing the stu-
dent's guilt, the disciplinarian would have to take the step sug-
gested in Goss and permit a more formal hearing to take place
where the accused student could confront the witnesses and present
witnesses in his own behalf.
The interests of the school that prevented the requirement of a
full hearing 4 are not applicable to this type of secondary investiga-
tion. The only cost to the school would be the time spent by the
person checking the information given by the student and could be
51. Id. at 1249.
52. Id. at 1249.
53. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583.
54. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583 for a detailed discussion of these interests.
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done with minimal disruption of either teachers or students. While
some may argue that this could be substantial given the great
frequency of suspensions in our school systems today, it is small
compared to the reduced risk of error that would result and may
instill in the accused student the belief that his opportunity to
explain his position was more than a formal meaningless gesture.
II. WHEN A HEARING is NECESSARY
While Dixon and other cases speak of procedural due process
requiring a hearing, the courts have not found that in all cases the
failure to have a "hearing," in its most basic sense, is a denial of
due process. Where a student unequivocally admitted misconduct
that was the basis of the charge, courts have held that a hearing,
functioning as a procedural device to insure a fair and reliable
determination as to whether the student committed the alleged act,
is not essential. 55
So too was a hearing not found to be necessary where a student
has notice of the rule (it was read to him), the consequences of its
violation, that the acts which he was doing were in violation of that
rule, and yet nevertheless proceeds to violate the rule.5"
The courts however, have not completely eliminated the right
to a hearing in these special circumstances. They have said that
while the hearing is not required to serve as the vehicle for the
establishment of whether the alleged misconduct actually occurred,
a hearing must still be afforded the student for the more limited
purpose of providing an opportunity to present mitigating circum-
stances that would be relevant to the issue of punishment. 7 It
would seem that a hearing should also be provided the student so
that he can challenge the regulation that forms the basis for his
suspension, either on grounds of an inherent defect in the statute
or as it applies to him, including discriminatory enforcement.
III. CHARACTER OF THE HEARING
The hearing need not be a formalized proceeding." In short
suspensions it can be of the nature of a fairly informal administra-
tive consultation that bears very little resemblance to a trial.59 The
55. Betts v. Board of Education of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. Farrel v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1971).
57. Betts v. Board of Education of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1972); Keller v.
Fochs, 385 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
58. See p. 716 supra.
59. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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discipline cases that would result in long term suspensions or expul-
sions, as we shall see, require more.
A critical element of either proceeding is the atmosphere in
which the hearing is conducted. In Williams v. Dade"0 the court in
commenting on the character of the hearing held that the hearing
must not be of such a character as to explain the decision that had
already been reached, it instead must be so as to objectively hear
the facts and reach a fair decision.
The importance of this aspect of the hearing can not be under-
estimated if the hearing is to fulfill its function of trying to estab-
lish the facts in question and to minimize the possibility of the
result of the hearing being a miscarriage of justice. To permit the
function of the hearing to be to explain rather than investigate the
facts would be to assume the fact that is normally to be established
by the hearing and to relegate the right of the student to present
his side of the story into an exercise of futility. As Justice Frank-
furter said:
. . [Flairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided deter-
minations of the facts decisive of rights. . . . Secrecy is not
congenial to truth seeking and self-righteousness gives too slen-
der an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of
serious loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to
meet it."I (Emphasis added).
IV. IMPARTIAL HEARING BODY
The question of who is to hear a case of alleged student miscon-
duct is generally established by school board regulations or by state
statute. 2 The lack of financial resources, however, prevents the
establishment of one person or body whose sole function is to
hear discipline cases. As a result, school officials have been
forced to staff their discipline hearing bodies with people who
have other duties with the school.
The result of this multiplicity of roles within the school struc-
ture is that often the person who conducts the investigation of the
alleged misconduct is the same person(s) who must determine if the
conduct in fact occurred and warrants discipline. Immediately the
60. 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Williams v. Vermilion Parish, 345 F. Supp.
57 (W.D. La. 1972).
61. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter
concurring), also quoted in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
62. See for example Wis. STAT. § 120.13 (1973).
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question of whether a student received a fair hearing because of the
lack of the impartiality of the hearing body arises.
The requirement of impartiality does not require or demand
that a hearing body have no views whatsoever on matters that
come before them for decision. 3 It does, however, prevent one
from holding predetermined views toward particular issues or par-
ties (a personal bias) or a personal "interest" in the outcome of the
controversy. This latter "interest" most often results when a per-
son(s) occupies a combination of roles that can include advocate
and judge. 4
The student who seeks to challenge the impartiality of a school
official or board has to present a strong case of personal bias,
interest or combination of functions in order to be successful. Re-
cent cases in rejecting the need for an impartial decision maker
have generally justified their decision on the grounds that to re-
quire an independent person (one who would not be a school offi-
cial) to hear discipline cases would destroy the effective control
over the schools by the people in charge with its management, a
control mandated by law to be in the school board.65 A second
reason presented is that it would deny the people who best under-
stand the needs and working of the educational process the power
to effectively control the school environment to insure the maxi-
63. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
64. For an excellent discussion of characteristics affecting impartiality and the combina-
tion of functions see Buss, Procedural Due Process of School Discipline: Probing the
Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PENN. L. REV. 545, 618-30 (1971).
The courts have adopted the position that school officials involved in the initiation and
investigation of charges are not per se disqualified for conducting hearings, but that particu-
lar circumstances of a case can require an individual(s) withdrawal from the hearing. In
Center for Participant Education v. Marshall, 337 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972) the court
at page 135 illustrated this principle saying:
This limited combination by a school of prosecutorial and adjudicatory function is
not fundamentally unfair in the absence of a showing of other circumstances such
as malice or personal interest in the outcome, ... extraneous political pressures,
personal prejudice.
See also Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973); Duke v.
North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Lance v. Thompson, 432 F.2d 767
(5th Cir. 1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1967); Jones v. State Bd. of
Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1969), affd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. N.C. 1972); De Jesus
v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Mills v. Board of Education of D.C., 348
F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
65. Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); Linwood v. Board of Educa-
tion, City of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972).
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mum opportunity for learning.66
A few recent cases, however, have demonstrated that a lack of
impartiality can be so substantial a deprivation to the student so
as to constitute a denial of due process. In Sullivan v. Houston17 a
student had used profanity toward the principal and resumed the
sale of newspapers as a direct challenge to the principal. The court
found that this principal in conducting the hearing did not possess
sufficient detachment from the circumstances to provide the stu-
dent with a fair and dispassionate hearing."
The reason for the finding was cast in terms of personal con-
frontation between the student and the principal to the extent that
it would be difficult for the principal to conduct a fair hearing. In
reaching this decision the court pointed out that the principal ac-
knowledged that the purpose of the hearing in fact was not to hear
the student's story but to extract an apology.
In an expulsion case involving a student's possession of mari-
juana" the court found that the school board in acting in both the
roles of investigator and hearing body could not maintain sufficient
impartiality to satisfy due process. The court said that under these
circumstances "for the board to act as investigator, prosecutor,
judge, and jury makes a mockery of the notion of a fair hearing. ' 70
While these cases reflect a willingness of the courts to look at
the impartiality of the hearing body, absent a strong combination
of personal bias and/or dual functions, the argument of lack of an
impartial tribunal being a denial of due process will likely fall on
deaf ears.71
66. Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972).
67. 333 F. Supp. 1149, (S.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. 333 F. Supp. at 1175.
69. Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
70. Id. at 839.
71. The necessity argument which provides justification for having people occupy two
or more roles in the disciplinary process should be used carefully to avoid its being thought
of as a valid defense in all cases. It would seem that when there are alternative procedures
available to decide a particular case, the procedure which would produce the greatest
appearance of impartiality should be used. In addition, a person who is on the hearing body
should refrain from performing other functions wherever it is possible, and if not possible
and he can disqualify himself from participating on the hearing panel without depriving the
board of the power to act, he probably must do so if the result is an impartial board.
American Cyanamid Co. v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Texaco Inc. v. F.T.C.,
336 F.2d 754 (D.C. C. 1964).
A school hearing body should also take steps wherever possible to insulate its decision-
making and adversary function when setting up a procedure to be used in discipline cases.
This could be accomplished by assigning the role of investigator to people who are prevented
from then participating in the decision-making process; an example would be the creation
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V. PRODUCTION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
In outlining this aspect of the hearing Dixon found that the
student must be given the names of the witnesses to be used against
him and an oral or written report of the facts to which each
testifies. Thereupon the student is to be given the opportunity to
present to the hearing board his own defense in the form of oral
testimony or written affidavits in his behalf. Cross-examination of
witnesses was not required.12
In interpreting and implementing these guidelines courts have
generally held that due process does not require the mandatory
production of prosecution witnesses and the right to cross-examine
witnesses that are present at the hearing. 3 This strict and limited
reading of Dixon has not been accepted by all courts however, and
many courts suggest the desirability of the production of the accu-
satory witnesses and the right to cross-examine those witnesses. 4
Before looking at the reasons for the difference in opinion on
the issue by the courts it is especially important to reiterate again
the nature of due process of being a balancing process that is to
take into account the interest of both parties. Factors that are
of ad hoc committees to do work for the hearing body. Buss, Procedural Due Process For
School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PENN. L. REv. 545, 627-30
(1971); Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
72. Dixon v. Alabama Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
1368 U.S. 930 (1969). See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing
the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PENN. L. REV. 545, 594 for an interpretation of the
Dixon statement.
73. Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1028 (1968); General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133,
147-48 (W.D. Mo. 1968); State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822,
826 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943); Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433
(1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees,
University of Illinois, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956); Scoggin v. Lincoln
University, 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2nd
Cir. 1967); Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972); Linwood v. Board of
Education, City of Peoria; 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972); Boykin v. Fairchild Board of
Education, 492 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1974); Mando v. Wesleyville School Dist., 81 Pa. Dist.
& Co. R. 125 (C.R. 1952).
74. Estaban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Marquette v. McRhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 567 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley,
281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Geiger v. Milford Independent School District, 51 Pa.
Dist. & Co. R. 647 (C. P. 1944); Tibbs v. Board of Education of Franklin, 114 N.J. Super.
287; 276 A.2d 165 (1971); Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377 (Kan. 1973); Fielder v. Board of
Education, 340 F. Supp. 722; De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972);
Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. N.C. 1972); Mills v. Board of Education of D.C.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Black Coalition v. Portland Sch. Dist., 484 F.2d 1040 (9th
Cir. 1973); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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considered in the "weighing" include the nature of the right
claimed, the benefit to the student in having a procedure available
to him, the disadvantage of not having it, and the burden that the
procedure would place on the proceeding if the right was recog-
nized.
In determining whether a student has the right to confront the
witnesses at the hearing and to cross-examine them, the courts
have frequently pointed to two factors that have caused them to
be hesitant in finding such a right. These are the lack of authority
of the school officials to compel the attendance of witnesses75 and
the burden that the recognition of such right would place not only
on the proceeding itself but also the effect this right would have
on the educational process."
The principal concern of these courts if this right of the accused
student was recognized is the effect it would have on the student-
witness who provides to the school authorities the information
upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based." There is a fear
expressed that fellow students who are subject to cross-
examination are often the subject of reprisal from students about
whom information was given. They are also in a position where
they could suffer extreme humiliation and embarrassment at the
hands of a skilled questioner, especially an attorney. In addition,
the time spent testifying at a hearing where cross-examination was
permitted could be substantial, thereby denying the student the
right to use such time for his own educational pursuits. 71
On the other hand, the interest of an accused person in the right
to confront his accusers and submit them to cross-examination is
a right that has been recognized as vital in a number of criminal
and administrative hearings.79 The importance of such right was
eloquently stated by Justice Warren in Green v. McElroy'O where
he said:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental actions
75. Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377 (Kan. 1973).
76. Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972).
77. Id. at 666; Tibbs v. Board of Education of Franklin, 114 N.J. Super. 287; 276 A.2d
165 (1971); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972).
78. Graham v. Knutyen, 351 F. Supp. 642 (D. Neb. 1972).
79. Willmer v. Committee & Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), hearing to determine
fitness for admission to the bar. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), state criminal
proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), juvenile delinquency proceedings. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), hearings to terminate aid to dependent children payments.
80. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is in the
case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where
the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose mem-
ory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the require-
ment of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient
roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment which pro-
vides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This Court has
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken
out not only in criminal cases, (citation omitted) but also in all
types of cases where administrative and regulatory action were
under scrutiny."1 (emphasis added).
A. Short Term Suspensions
In weighing the interests of the school against that of the stu-
dent, the courts in the discipline cases where a short term suspen-
sion is the punishment have declared that the right to cross-
examination was not necessary to insure a student a fair hearing.8 2
In denying its applicability as a matter of right, the court cited the
possible overwhelming burden it would place on administrative
facilities and resources and also pointed out the impact it would
have on the effectiveness of discipline as a part of the educational
development of the student. The court concluded, however, with
the statement that in some circumstances it might be required. 3
Exactly what circumstances will come under this exception is
difficult to foresee. It would seem that the most likely situation will
be where the witness is a teacher or other school personnel. Their
appearance would present little threat to them personally, could be
achieved with only slight disruption to the hearing, and yet at the
same time provide a valuable safeguard to the accused student.
A second circumstance that may require the right to cross-
examination arises out of the statement in Goss where the court
said that when the disciplinarian is alerted to the existence of a
dispute about facts and arguments concerning cause and effect he
81. Id. at 496-97.
82. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 at 583 (1975).
83. Id. at 584.
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may summon the accuser and permit cross-examination." While
admittedly the decision lies in the discretion of the school authori-
ties, it would seem that if this power was not exercised in good faith
by the disciplinarian it could be grounds for finding that the stu-
dent was denied a chance for a fair hearing. The burden of estab-
lishing the lack of good faith would of course fall on the student
and most likely would be difficult to prove.
B. Long Term Suspension-Expulsions
Long term suspensions and expulsions may require more."
Given the increased penalty and irreparable harm to the student
that an expulsion imposes, the procedural due process "balancing
of interest" test would seem to require increased emphasis to the
student's interest in education being protected and a corresponding
lesser concern with the additional burdens and inconveniences of
time and money that may be imposed on the school than was
required in the case of the short suspension.
This greater concern for protecting the student's rights would
probably not be sufficient to sustain an objection to the use of an
affidavit where the testimony is of minor importance or of a cumu-
lative nature. 6 When, however, the outcome of the hearing is di-
rectly dependent on the credibility of witnesses whose statements
are conflicting, it would seem that cross-examination should be
required in helping to establish the truth, absent compelling rea-
sons for not so requiring it.87
The need for the student to be able to cross-examine those who
will testify against him has been recognized with increased fre-
quency by the courts.8 They have pointed out that the identity of
the student witness must be revealed as a matter of minimum due
process under Dixon so that the threat of reprisal against the stu-
dent witness exists even if he is not required to appear in person
at the hearing and be subjected to cross-examination.89 Absent
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377 (Kan. 1973).
87. Id. at 387; De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Tibbs v. Board
of Education of Franklin, 276 A.2d 165 (1971).
88. See cases cited note 74 supra.
89. Tibbs v. Board of Education of Franklin, 276 A.2d 165, 170 (1971). The court noted
that while there may be in some cases a threat of reprisal to student witnesses, the schools
must be content to deal with threats or intimidation by involving the help of the law




compelling circumstances, there would be little reason then for not
requiring the substantially more revealing personal testimony of
witness to be made available to the trier of the fact and the defense
in the search for the truth."
Procedures that meet the requirements of due process could
easily be formulated which would satisfy the student's need for the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers yet at the same
time recognize instances when the school's and witnesses' interests
must be considered. What follows is a proposed outline of a proce-
dure to that end.
C. Proposed Procedure
The accused student should by right be allowed to conduct a
cross-examination of all witnesses subject to limitation, however,
by the hearing body when they determined that the questions being
asked by the student or his attorney were badgering the witness."
The hearing body would be empowered to carefully control the
scope of the cross-examination to prevent abuse by limiting it to
the material essentials of the direct testimony and not permitting
undue protraction."2
While this somewhat restricted procedure for permitting cross-
examination may be suitable for the vast majority of cases, there
may be circumstances where requiring a student witness to tell his
story in the presence of the accused student and to be subject to
cross-examination would inhibit rather than encourage the search
for truth.
When found to exist, the right to cross-examination would have
to give way. Whether this situation exists would be a determination
to be made by the school officials.
This determination by the school not to require a witness to be
subject to confrontation and cross-examination would not be sub-
ject to the unfettered discretion of the school officials. As was
stated by the court which advanced portions of this procedure:
[ . . T]he board's conclusion to dispense with confrontation and
cross-examination must be based on a good faith decision, sup-
ported by persuasive evidence, that the accusing witness will be
inhibited to a significantly greater degree than would result sim-
90. Tibbs v. Board of Education of Franklin, 114 N.J. Super. 287, 295, 276 A.2d 165,
170 (1971); Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377, 387 (Kan. 1973).
91. Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377, 387 (Kan. 1973).
92. Tibbs v. Board of Education of Franklin, 114 N.J. Super. 287, 276 A.2d 165 (1971).
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ply from the inevitable fact that his accusations will be made
known to the accused student. Such a conclusion may also be
based on special circumstances concerning the accusing wit-
ness.9
3
If these special circumstances can be established convincingly
to exist, the school then would be permitted to hear the witness'
testimony out of the presence of the accused student. Responsibil-
ity for probing the testimony of the witness would then fall upon
the hearing body or perhaps an impartial person who could repre-
sent the interest of the accused student. All testimony taken in this
matter would have to be furnished to the student in the form of a
summary or transcript. 94
Admittedly this procedure leaves the decision of whether to
permit confrontation and cross-examination in the hands of school
authorities. It does, however, require them to permit at least a
limited form of cross-examination in the vast majority of cases and
establishes standards against which their decision not to permit
confrontation and cross-examination can be measured.
VI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel has gained increasing acceptance in recent
years in the administrative and civil aspects of the law. 5 Its recog-
nition as a vital part of due process is generally grounded on the
need for added protection for an accused when he is subject to a
severe penalty if found guilty of the act charged. In comparing the
penalties of prison in criminal law (where the right to counsel is a
matter of right) and expulsion in school discipline, U.S. District
Court Judge Doyle said:
• . . [E]xpulsion from an institution of higher learning, or sus-
pension for a period of time substantial enough to prevent aca-
demic credit for a particular term, may well be and often is in
fact, a more severe sanction than a monetary fine or a relatively
brief confinement imposed by a court in a criminal proceeding. 6
93. De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70, 76 (D. Conn. 1973).
94. Id. at 76.
95. Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), termination of welfare benefits; U.S. v. Wilier, 309 F. Supp.
50 (N.D. Cal. 1969), revocation of selective service deferment; Cardinal v. Munyan, 30 App.
Div. 2d 444, 292 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1968); FUSCO v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581
(1952), statutory right of dismissed public employee to hearing.




Not only is the student subject to a penalty severe enough to
warrant the added safeguard of an attorney, the needs of the stu-
dent in being able to have counsel as a matter of right are substan-
tial. A student who is charged with misconduct in the secondary
school is a fragile creature who is inexperienced in defending him-
self against accusation by adults. He will be awed by the nature
and importance of the proceeding thereby becoming reluctant or
unable to adequately present his position. His inability to analyze
whether the regulation he is accused of violating is sufficient to
withstand legal attack and his lack of skill in asking questions,
particularly when in cross-examination, makes him no match when
pitted against adults with an adversary proceeding. 7
The disadvantages of recognizing the right to counsel is found
primarily in the fear of an increased adversary relationship that
would develop between the student and the school authorities.
Other disadvantages cited by the courts is the fear that an attorney
through the use of his skills will dominate and control the hearing
and its result and that it will substantially increase the formality,
length and expense of the hearing."
The courts are divided as to whether the student should be
afforded the right to counsel if he desires one.9 The question is not
a real issue in most cases because most school authorities either
grant the student the right to have counsel when he requests it or
it is a right guaranteed by statute.99
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (where the right to counsel was recognized in juvenile
delinquency proceedings); Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE
W. REs. L. REV. 378 (1969).
98. For an excellent discussion of the disadvantage as well as advantages see Buss,
Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U.
PENN. L. REV. 545, 609-12 (1971).
99. Cases recognizing the right to counsel; Estaban v. Central Missouri State College,
277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), affd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970); Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1967); Mills v. Board
of Education of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Mills v. School Committee of
New Bedford, C.A. No. 72-1146-F (Mass. 1973); Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F.
Supp. 722, 731 (D. Neb. 1972); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D. N.C. 1972);
Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (6th Cir. 1973).
Cases rejecting right to counsel: Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir.
1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), affd. per curiam, 399 F.2d
638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Linwood v. Board of Education, 463
F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972).
100. See for example Wis. STAT. § 120.13 (1973).
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A. Short Term Suspensions
In short suspension cases, the informality of the hearing that
was recognized as permissible by Goss would be inconsistent 'with
granting the student the right to counsel. As explained earlier, in
many cases the hearing may be on the same day and even within
minutes of the alleged act by the student. To permit counsel in
these situations would severely restrict the possibility of quickly
resolving the problem since the hearing could not be held until
counsel was retained and able to arrange a meeting.
The court in Goss recognized the impracticality of requiring an
attorney in short term suspensions and declared that whether an
attorney can be present for the hearing is a matter within the
discretion of the disciplinarian. 1 It would seem that the difficult
cases that may require counsel would be rare and would probably
involve either a substantial personality conflict between the student
and hearing officer such that conversation to any meaningful ex-
tent is impossible or else a student who is unable to grasp and
participate to any degree in the informal give and take of the
informal hearing.
B. Long Term Suspension-Expulsion
The long term suspension and expulsion hearing stands on dif-
ferent footing. Due to the seriousness of the charge, the fact finding
process is extremely important. In addition, the fear of an adverse
atmosphere being created as a result of the presence of the attorney
is pure folly, the fact that the student is subject to a serious penalty
will create an atmosphere of antagonism that will exist irrespective
of whether the student is permitted counsel. In light of the relative
infrequency of this type os hearing, the cost and time arguments
are not persuasive, especially when one considers the interest of the
student at stake.
The school's fear of the possible disruptive effect that an attor-
ney could have in a school disciplinary hearing has been overstated.
In Goldberg v. Kelly1 12 Justice Brennan, in speaking of the advan-
tages and disadvantages that the presence of counsel has on a
hearing, said:
Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual conten-
tions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and gen-
101. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
102. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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erally safeguard the interests of the recipient. We do not antici-
pate that this assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encum-
ber the hearing.101 (Emphasis added).
In addition, it would seem necessary in the context of direct
questioning and cross-examination that the student be entitled to
appear before the hearing body with the same degree of skill and
competence in questioning as those who are presenting the case
against him. To deny this to the student would be to in effect deny
the student the right to a meaningful cross-examination." 4
While there seems to be a need for the student to have counsel
with him at the hearing if he so desires, it is unlikely that it will
take court action for this right to be given to him. Many states have
statutes which permit by express language the right for the student
to have an attorney. 105 Secondly, there will be very few school
officials who would deny the student the right to be helped by an
attorney if he requested one. They are very cognizant of the interest
of the student that is at stake and will accede to any reasonable
demand, the request of permitting counsel to assist certainly being
one.
VII. WHEN A HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY-EMERGENCY
A question that arises in this aspect of due process is whether,
and under what circumstances, a suspension of a student can be
enforced prior to the hearing to determine the validity of the
charges that justify suspension or expulsion. While this issue could
arise in the context of a short suspension, it is most likely to be
found when the school would like to impose an interim suspension
until such time as a final finding of fact can be made.0 6
A basic concept of due process requires that a person can not
be deprived of a protected interest (the right to an education) prior
to a hearing where guilt or innocence is determined that would
103. Id. at 270-71.
104. Procedures could be adopted that would reduce the threat of students' counsel
controlling the hearing or intimidating witnesses. These could include requiring the lawyer
to remain seated when speaking to witnesses or board personnel and requiring the counsel
to receive permission to speak from the head of the hearing before he speaks. Abbott, Due
Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 378 (1969). A second
possible procedure could be that pronounced in Estaban v. Central Missouri State College,
277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967) that permitted counsel to be present with and
help the accused student but not allow the attorney to cross-examine any adverse witness.
105. See for example Wis. STAT. § 120.13 (1973).
106. See for example Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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justify that deprivation. 117 To be considered against this interest,
however, is the obligation of the school to provide an atmosphere
which is conducive to attaining an education and to protect the
rights of other students to an education as well as their right to be
free from assaults on their persons or property.
The courts in looking at these competing interests have decided
that when the disruption of the educational process will be imper-
iled if the student is permitted to remain in the school pending a
hearing, the rights of the accused student must give way to the
rights of the school. In Hernandez v. School District #1, Denver"0
the court prescribing to this position said:
The application of such a rule (a hearing prior to suspension)
would mean that the plaintiff could, and the evidence indicates
they would, continue their disruptive conduct during the period
that written charges were being prepared, an "impartial decision
maker" selected, reasonable notice of the time and the place of
the hearing given the plaintiff, the time necessary to subpoena
witnesses and the time required for hearing. . . for the mean-
time, the other students would be denied their rights to the educa-
tional processes of the school. The.requirement of procedural due
process cannot be so construed.0 '
This position has been recognized by the great majority of the
courts as a necessary infringement of due process rights in school
suspension cases."0 The United States Supreme Court in Goss
addressed this question and stated that there are recurring situa-
tions where prior notice and hearing cannot be required before a
student is suspended. Justice White said:
Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process
may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the
necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon
as practicable .... "I (Emphasis added).
Recognition of the school's power to administer summary sus-
pension from school in emergency situations requires the school in
107. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863).
108. 315 F. Supp. 289 (Colo. 1970).
109. Id. at 293.
110. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis.
1970); Smith v. Miller, 514 P.2d 377 (1973); Fielder v. Board of Education, 346 F. Supp.
722 (Neb. 1972); Pervis v. Le Marque, 466 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975).
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the first instance to determine if there is an emergency. Relevant
factors that should be evaluated by the school in deciding whether
the nature and quality of the conduct and the setting in which it
occurred indicate that immediate suspension is necessary include:
(1) the physical and emotional safety and well-being of the accused
student, (2) whether the accused's continued presence will incite
other students to disruptions, and (3) whether the accused student
has demonstrated that the alleged misconduct will recur if he is
permitted to remain in school.
If an emergency situation is found by the school to exist, the
school is entitled to immediately suspend the student. They must,
however, provide the student with a hearing as soon after the sus-
pension as possible." 2 How soon after the suspension the hearing
must take place would, of course, depend on the facts of each case,
but certainly it would be less than what is required between the
notice of disciplinary action and the hearing. In cases where the
discipline to be taken is expulsion or an extended suspension, this
means an interim hearing (functionally similar to a preliminary
hearing) to decide if there are sufficient grounds and need to sus-
pend the student pending the hearing which would determine his
guilt.Y3
VII. THE WISCONSIN STATUTE
Wisconsin has adopted a statute, 120.1314 which provides the
112. Id.
113. Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
114. WIs. STAT. § 120.13 (1973):
SCHOOL BOARD POWERS. The school board of a common or union high school district
may:
(1) School Government Rules; Suspension; Expulsion. (a) Make rules for the
organization, gradation and government of the schools of the school district, includ-
ing rules pertaining to conduct and dress of pupils in order to maintain good decorum
and a favorable academic atmosphere, which shall take effect when approved by a
majority of the school board and filed with the school district clerk.
(b) The school district administrator or any principal or teacher designated by
him also may make rules, with the consent of the school board, and may suspend a
pupil for not more than 3 school days or, if a notice of expulsion hearing has been
sent under par. (c), for not more than a total of 7 consecutive school days for
noncompliance with such rules or school board rules, or for conduct by the pupil
while at school or while under the supervision of a school authority which endangers
the property, health or safety of others. Prior to any suspension, the pupil shall be
advised of the reason for the proposed suspension. The pupil may be suspended if it
is determined that he is guilty of noncompliance with such rule, or of the conduct
charged, and that his suspension is reasonably justified. The parent or guardian of a
suspended minor pupil shall be given prompt notice of the suspension and the reason
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authority and basic framework for school districts to handle stu-
dent disciplinary proceedings. In light of Goss and other recent
school disciplinary cases there arises the question of whether the
statute satisfies the requirements of due process.
A. Short Term Suspensions
The statute provides in short term suspensions"' that "prior to
any suspension the student shall be advised of the reason for the
proposed suspension." If advised is used here in its common parl-
ance, (to inform someone of action taken or about to be taken) a
serious issue is presented as to whether this statement is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of a hearing required in Goss.
In emergency situations"' there is little doubt that advisement
therefor. The suspended pupil or his parent or guardian may, within 5 school days
following the commencement of the suspension have a conference with the school
district administrator or his designee who shall be someone other than a principal,
administrator or teacher in the suspended pupil's school. If the school district admin-
istrator or his designee finds that the pupil was suspended unfairly or unjustly, or
that the suspension was inappropriate, given the nature of the alleged offense, or that
the pupil suffered undue consequences or penalties as a result of the suspension,
reference to the suspension on the pupil's school record shall be expunged. Such
finding shall be made within 15 days of said conference. A pupil suspended under
this paragraph shall not be denied the opportunity to take any quarterly, semester
or grading period examinations missed during the suspension period.
(c) The school board may expel a pupil from school whenever it finds him guilty
of repeated refusal or neglect to obey the rules, or finds that he engaged in conduct
while at school or while under the supervision of a school authority which endangers
the property, health or safety of others, and is satisfied that the interest of the school
demands his expulsion. Prior to such expulsion, the school board shall hold a hearing
thereon. Not less than 5 days' written notice of the hearing shall be sent to the pupil
and, if the pupil is a minor, to his parent or guardian, specifying the particulars of
the alleged refusal, neglect or conduct, stating the time and place of the hearing and
stating that the hearing may result in the pupil's expulsion. The pupil and, if the pupil
is a minor, his parent or guardian may be represented at the hearing by counsel. The
school board shall keep written minutes of the hearing. Upon the ordering by the
school board of the expulsion of a pupil, the school district clerk shall mail a copy
of the order to the pupil and, if the pupil is a minor, to his parent or guardian. The
expelled pupil or, if the pupil is a minor, his parent or guardian may appeal the
expulsion to the state superintendent. An appeal from the decision of the state
superintendent may be taken within 30 days to the circuit court of the county in
which the school is located. This paragraph shall be printed on the face or back of
the notice.
In light of the adoption of ch. 89 by the Wisconsin legislature which provides for special
programs for exceptional and special students, there exists a serious question as to whether
a student can ever be totally excluded from school without being in violation of ch. 89.
Whether ch. 89 will be so interpreted remains to be determined.
115. Any suspension for not more than 3 school days.
116. See p. 732 supra, for discussion of due process requirements in emergency situa-
tions.
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prior to suspension is sufficient. The courts have uniformly held
that a hearing is not required in these circumstances due in large
part to the hazard posed to the school atmosphere and the resulting
need for swift summary action to prevent further disruption to the
educational process."7
When there is no crisis present that demands immediate action,
the courts seem to require more. As Goss stated, ". . some kind
of notice and some kind of hearing' '1 18 is required. This statement
has been found to mean a presentation of the charge to the student
and if denies it, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have
and the opportunity to present his side of the story."' In appropri-
ate circumstances, even more may be required.'20
While Goss expressly recognized the need for an informal hear-
ing, these requirements demand more than merely explaining to
the student why he is being suspended. An effort must be made in
the "hearing" to ascertain whether the alleged act occurred, not to
merely inform the student of the conclusion reached by the hearing
officer. Courts have insisted that when a hearing is held merely for
the purpose of explanation (advisement) rather than to investigate
the charges, the student has been denied due process.'
A second question which arises is whether a student who is
merely told that he is being suspended for violation of the school
regulations can have a second conference with the school district
administration, 2 complying with the hearing requirements out-
lined above, "cure" an initial inadequate hearing and provide due
process for the student.
The question of whether a second hearing that complies with
due process requirements can "cure" an earlier constitutionally
deficient hearing is an unresolved issue in school discipline
cases.' In light of Goss which determined the impact of a suspen-
117. See cases cited note 110 supra.
118. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
119. Id. at 583.
120. Id. at 584.
121. See p. 20 supra.
122. This is authorized by Wis. STAT. § 120.13 (1973):
The suspended pupil or his parent may within 5 school days following the commence-
ment of the suspension, have a conference with the school district administra-
tion. ...
123. Cases that recognize a "cure" include: Sullivan v. Houston Independent School
Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board,
472 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973).




sion on the student's education and reputation to be substantial
enough to require due process protection, it would seem that cure
would not be possible to achieve.
Goss held that the student's interest in education was so impor-
tant that it could not be taken away prior to a hearing to determine
whether that deprivation was indeed warranted. To allow a second
hearing that would be held subsequent to the imposition of the
suspension"4 to provide the necessary protections would render the
emphasis by the court that the hearing be held prior to the sus-
pension, in effect meaningless. It is of little solace to the student
to find that after he has served his "sentence" there will be a
hearing to determine whether that "sentence" was justified. The
damage feared by Goss will be imposed on the student and it would
be too late for all of the hearings in the world to erase the harm
done.
B. Long Term Suspension-Expulsions
The statute provides a separate procedure when the act of the
student could result in his expulsion from school. Foremost is the
requirement that the student is entitled to written notice of the
hearing at least five days prior to the actual hearing. This notice
is to specify (1) the particular of the alleged refusal, neglect or
conduct, (2) the time and place of the hearing, and (3) that the
hearing may result in the pupil's expulsion.
What is sufficient statement to constitute notice is of course
dependent on the circumstances. In addition, notice does not re-
quire that it be contained in one document or offered at one time.
Courts, however, have included as a required element of notice that
the student be provided with the names of the principal witnesses
and the facts to which they will attest.12 1
While this particular issue has not yet been resolved, the failure
to provide these names to the student in advance of the hearing
could very possibly in itself be sufficient to the student so as to
constitute a denial of due process.
A second possible infirmity in the procedure outlined by the
statute is the form of the order, more specifically, the failure to
require that the order state the finding of the school officials which
justifies expulsion. The reasons for this requirement are self appar-
ent. The statute declares under what circumstances a student can
124. See note 122 supra.
125. See note 34 supra.
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be expelled" 6 and if the findings of the school board were not
articulated, the expulsion may rest on grounds that the student had
neither notice or an opportunity to defend, an obvious denial of due
process. Courts have held even the possibility that the school offi-
cials' decision rests on an improper basis is sufficient to require
that the decision be set aside.'2
A number of courts that have considered this question have
required the findings of facts for the reasons outlined above. 128
While it may be questionable whether the lack of this requirement
alone would constitute a denial of due process, it is something that
can be easily satisfied and should be done as a matter of sound
suspension policy.
While no mention is made in the statute of the actual ground
rules of the hearing itself, leaving this matter to the discretion of
each school district, mention should be made of a few parameters
that have been accepted by some courts concerning the admission
and consideration of evidence. These include permitting the hear-
ing body to consider only that evidence which is presented to them
at the hearing in reaching a decision," 9 prohibiting consideration
of any evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment
rights, 30 preventing the refusal to testify to be taken as an admis-
sion of guilt,' permitting the hearing body to rely on factual de-
terminations made in the course of the judicial process, 3 2 and
admitting of hearsay evidence in the hearings.'33 While the
student disciplinary process is not a criminal process, these limits
placed on the proceedings by the courts recognize the basic need
for fairness and give the school officials the opportunity to consider
almost all relevant evidence in reaching their decision.
126. WIs. STAT. § 120.13(c) (1973) lists the following as grounds for discipline:
1) noncompliance with such rules [rules made by school district administrator,
principal, or teacher with the consent of the school board] or school board rules.
2) conduct by the pupil while at school or while under the supervision of a school
authority which endangers the property, health, or safety of others.
127. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
128. Mills v. Board of Education of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Fielder
v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972); De Jesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp.
70, 77 (D. Conn. 1972) (incorrigibly bad behavior not enough).
129. Gevin v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. N.C. 1972); Lee v. Macon Board of Educa-
tion, 490 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1974).
130. Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835, 839 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
131. Id. at 841.
132. Black Coalition v. Portland School District, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1973).





The recent court intervention into school discipline should not
be seen by school administration as a direct attack on their author-
ity to manage and control the educational process. It instead
should serve as the impetus for schools to transform the traditional
concepts of due process into a classroom demonstration of how a
democratic society functions.
Students have a peculiar need for receiving fair treatment. In
a time when the "system" is being challenged on all fronts, stu-
dents are looking for evidence that they live in a fair society in
which rules, not the arbitrary action of men, governs. If their first
contact with the "system" results in feelings of unfairness and
bitterness, the damage done may be irreparable.
In measuring the needs of the student, Justice Powell, in his
dissent in Goss, pointed out that throughout our history there are
differences which must be considered in determining the right of
children as compared to adults. The result of these differences,
concludes Powell, is that a student should not be awarded the same
protection as adults when a right is subject to deprivation.
The error in Justice Powell's analysis is that while it is true that
we treat children different than adults, it has been the practice of
society to award infants more protection not less. The law is replete
with examples in contract, tort, and criminal law where the infant
has protections more extensive than that which is given to adults.
How ironic it would be if when a young person's most coveted
interest is at stake he is suddenly given less protections in defending
that interest than is given adults.
The courts, contrary to the dissent in Goss, are not demanding
that the school officials abdicate their responsibility of running an
educational institution. They only seek to have the student ac-
corded the same right to fair treatment that is given an adult. Let
him know what he is accused of doing and give him a real chance
to explain his position. The additional time and cost that may
result from this procedure will not be wasted if the end product of
the proceeding is that the student feels that he received a "fair
shake."
This is not to say that a full-fledged proceeding should be re-
quired. The courts have recognized that not only would the cost
be prohibitive, but that a lesser proceeding can achieve the same
sense of fairness and remain a part of the educational process.
Minimum requirements should include (1) adequate notice of the
19751
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hearing, (2) a hearing that is investigative and not explanatory, and
(3) an impartial hearing body if possible. When an expulsion is the
possible penalty, the additional safeguards of the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses in all but special circumstances and
the right to counsel if the student requests should be added.
There will be circumstances when less may be required, but the
emphasis by the school should be not to provide only the very
minimum required to satisfy due process but to provide as much
opportunity for the student to defend his position as time, re-
sources and the educational setting will allow.
DENNIS J. CHRISTENSEN
